The New Mobility of Knowledge: Digital Information Systems and Global Flagship Networks by Dieter Ernst
The U.S. Congress established the East-West Center
in 1960 to foster mutual understanding and coopera-
tion among the governments and peoples of the
Asia Pacific region including the United States.
Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. govern-
ment with additional support provided by private
agencies, individuals, corporations, and Asian and
Pacific governments.
East-West Center Working Papers are circulated for
comment and to inform interested colleagues about
work in progress at the Center.





























Dieter Ernst is a Senior Fellow and Theme Leader for economic
studies at the East-West Center. He is also a research professor
at the Center for Technology and Innovation (TIK) at the
University of Oslo. His previous affiliations include the OECD,
Paris, as senior advisor; the Berkeley Roundtable on the
International Economy; the University of California at Berkeley
as senior fellow; and the Copenhagen Business School as
professor of international management. He is coeditor of
International Production Networks in Asia: Rivalry or Riches?
(2000).  He also serves on the Committee on Information
Technology and International Cooperation (ITIC) of the U.S.
Social Science Research Council.
Forthcoming in Latham, R. and S. Sassen (eds.), Cooperation and
Conflict in a Connected World. New York: Social Science
Research Council. 2002.
East-West Center Working Papers: Economics Series reports on
research in progress. This paper has been peer-reviewed. The
views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily
those of the Center. Please direct orders and requests to the
East-West Center's Publication Sales Office. The price for
Working Papers is $3.00 each plus postage. For surface mail, add
$3.00 for the first title plus $0.75 for each additional title or copy
sent in the same shipment. For airmail within the U.S. and its
territories, add $4.00 for the first title plus $0.75 for each
additional title or copy in the same shipment. For airmail
elsewhere, add $7.00 for the first title plus $4.00 for each
additional title or copy in the same shipment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Even the most “market-friendly” governments agree that knowledge is critical for 
sustaining economic growth and welfare. Hence the focus of policy-makers has shifted to 
improving the economy´s capacity to create, disseminate and use specialized knowledge 
more quickly and efficiently. There is a widespread belief  that if national governments 
manage to build robust knowledge-based societies, globalization may become an 
opportunity rather than a threat (OECD, 1999). An important assumption underlying 
these policies is that knowledge and skills are stickier in space (i.e. less mobile) than 
finance or production facilities (Enright, 1998; Markusen, 1996). 
This assumption however becomes increasingly problematic in a globally 
connected “digital economy”. We argue that the mobility of knowledge will increase, due 
to a combination of two forces: the rapid development and diffusion of  digital 
information systems (DIS), and the spread of flagship-dominated global networks. These 
changes in corporate (IT-based) networking practices will have far-reaching implications 
for international cooperation and conflict. If knowledge becomes more spatially fluid, 
this could provide new opportunities that lower-tier network suppliers should strive to 
exploit. The combined forces of GFN and DIS may provide new opportunities, pressures 
and incentives for local firms in developing economies to upgrade their capabilities, 
provided appropriate policies and support institutions are in place. However, they may   
also erode the competitiveness of existing clusters and obstruct attempts to upgrade them.   
Yet very little is known about what precisely is happening, and about the drivers 
and impacts of these processes. While large bodies of theoretical and applied work exist on the individual topics of DIS, the international dimension of corporate networks, and 
international knowledge diffusion, their mutual interaction is still mostly uncharted 
territory. There is a need to bridge this gap through “appreciative theories”, as defined in 
Richard Nelson´s thought-provoking review of economic growth theory (1995)
1.  
This paper develops a conceptual framework that links together the above three 
areas of research, as a first step towards an appreciative theory. We first introduce a new 
agenda for the economic study of knowledge that reflects the co-evolution of DIS  and 
trans-boundary forms of corporate networking practices. We then highlight forces that 
that drive the development of IT-enabled GFN, and look at the economic structure and 
peculiar characteristics of the flagship network model that foster the new mobility of 
knowledge. In a fourth step, we explore prerequisites for knowledge diffusion through 
GFN. We conclude by assessing resulting policy challenges. 
 
1. A NEW AGENDA FOR THE ECONOMIC STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE 
Empirical research on recent globalization trends has shown important 
transformations Historically, the main drivers have been multinational corporations 
(MNCs) which have been around for a long time (e.g., Wilkins, 1970). Until recently, 
however, their international production has focused on the penetration of protected 
markets through tariff-hopping investments, and on the use of assets developed at home 
to exploit international factor cost differentials, primarily for labor (e.g., Dunning, 1981). 
                                                 
1 In contrast to  formal growth theories, appreciative theories do not attempt to compress stylized facts into 
rigorous formulations. Rather, an attempt is made to include more of the observed empirical richness of IT 
and transformations in business organization than formal theories. This of course comes at the cost of 
being unable to model these relationships mathematically. Hence the need for formal theories. But for the 
latter to be fruitful, they need to be based on appreciative theories, and on the findings of case studies and 
econometric analysis. 
  2 This has given rise to a peculiar pattern of international production: offshore production 
sites in low-cost locations are linked through triangular trade with the major markets in 
North America and Europe (e.g., Dicken, 1992). 
A progressive liberalization and deregulation of international trade and 
investment, and the rapid development and diffusion of information and communication 
technology (IT) have fundamentally changed the global competitive dynamics, in which 
MNCs operate. While both market access and cost reductions remain important, it 
became clear that they have to be reconciled with a number of equally important 
requirements that encompass: the exploitation of uncertainty through improved 
operational flexibility (e.g., Kogut, 1985; and Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994); a 
compression of speed-to-market through reduced product development and product life 
cycles (e.g., Flaherty, 1986); learning and the acquisition of specialized external 
capabilities (e.g., Antonelli, 1992; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Zander and Kogut, 1995; 
Zanfei, 2000; Dunning, 2000); and a shift of market penetration strategies from 
established to new and unknown markets (e.g., Christensen, 1997).  
In response to the increasingly demanding requirements of global competition, 
three interrelated transformations have occurred in the organization of international 
economic transactions. We argue that the combination of these three transformations has 
substantially increased the mobility of knowledge. First, there is a new divide in 
industrial organization: a transition is under way from “multinational corporations”, with 
their focus on stand-alone overseas investment projects, to “global network flagships” 
that integrate their geographically dispersed supply, knowledge and customer bases into 
global (and regional) production and knowledge networks (GFN) (Ernst, forthcoming). 
  3 These networks help the flagships to sustain their competitiveness, by providing them 
with access to specialized suppliers at lower-cost locations who excel in quick and 
flexible response to the flagships’ requirements.  
Second, GFN have acted as a catalyst for international knowledge diffusion, 
providing a combination of new opportunities, pressures and incentives for local 
suppliers  to upgrade their capabilities. Opportunities include exposure to the flagship`s 
management practices and technological knowledge, involving a substantial amount of 
tacit knowledge. Equally important are pressures and incentives for local suppliers to 
invest in their knowledge base and capabilities. 
Third, a long-term process of developing digital information systems (DIS) has 
enabled the same infrastructure to accommodate manipulation and transmission of voice, 
video, and data (Chandler and Cortada, 2000). The use of DIS as a management tool has 
experienced three important transformations (Nolan, 2000). From a machine to automate 
transaction processing, the focus has shifted to the extraction of value from information 
resources, and then further to the establishment of Internet-enabled flexible information 
infrastructures that can support the extraction and exchange of knowledge across firm 
boundaries and national borders. Compared to earlier generations of DIS, the Internet 
appears to provide much greater opportunities to share knowledge with a much greater 
number of people faster, more accurately, and in greater detail,  even if they are not 
permanently co-located (Ernst, 2000b, 2001a, and 2001b)
2. This has created new 
                                                 
2 While such forms of  interactive learning across borders are still exceptional, they 
illustrate nevertheless a huge potential for reorganizing the global chain of knowledge 
creation. Once these developments gather momentum, they will have dramatic 
implications for established localized clusters. But when this happens, it may be too late 
to start research on this topic. 
  4 opportunities for extending knowledge exchange across organizational and national 
boundaries, hence magnifying the first two transformations. 
If these propositions are correct, the combined forces of globalization and DIS 
may have serious implications, not the least for developing economies: the 
competitiveness of existing clusters may erode, as the mobility of knowledge becomes 
less constrained in space. However, new opportunities may also emerge as enhanced 
mobility of knowledge may contribute to an upgrading of such clusters. This describes a 
new agenda for the economic study of knowledge: Do GFN and DIS make knowledge 
spatially fluid? How will this affect the spatial distribution of knowledge? And what does 
this imply for policy-making? 
2. FORCES DRIVING GLOBAL FLAGSHIP NETWORKS 
  What has driven the shift in industrial organization from “multinational 
corporations” to “global network flagships” that integrate their dispersed supply, 
knowledge and customer bases into global (and regional) production and knowledge 
networks? To answer this question, we introduce a stylized model of globalization 
drivers, focusing on three inter-related explanatory variables: institutional change 
through liberalization, information and communications technology (IT), and 
competition. 
2.1 Institutional Change: Liberalization 
North (1996; 12) defines institutions as “the rules of the game of a society that 
structure human interaction.” They are composed of formal rules (statute law, common 
law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behavior, and self-imposed 
codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both. Institutions shape the 
  5 allocation of resources, the rules of competition and firm behavior. Liberalization affects 
all aspects of institutions, but at different speed. While changes will first affect formal 
rules, informal constraints and enforcement mechanisms are more difficult to change. 
This implies that there is no homogeneous model of liberalization, but many different and 
often hybrid forms. 
We take liberalization as convenient shorthand for institutional changes that affect 
globalization. Liberalization dates back to the early 1970s: it thrived in response to the 
breakdown of fixed exchange rate regimes and the failure of Keynesianism to cope with 
pervasive stagflation. To a large degree, it has been initiated by government policies. But 
there are also other actors that have played an important role: financial institutions; rating 
agencies; supra-national institutions like bi-lateral or multi-lateral investment treaties and 
regional integration schemes, like the EU or NAFTA.  In some countries with 
decentralized devolution of political power, regional governments can also play an 
important role. 
Liberalization covers four main areas: trade, capital flows, FDI policies, and 
privatization. While each of these has generated separate debates in the literature, they 
hang together. Earlier success in trade liberalization has sparked an expansion of trade 
and FDI, increasing the demand for cross-border capital flows. This has increased the 
pressure for a liberalization of capital markets, forcing more and more countries to open 
their capital accounts. In turn this has led to a liberalization of FDI policies, and to 
privatization tournaments.  
The overall effect of liberalization has been a considerable reduction in the cost 
and risks of international transactions and a massive increase in international liquidity. 
  6 Global corporations (the network flagships) have been the primary beneficiaries: 
liberalization provides them with a greater range of choices for market entry between 
trade, licensing, subcontracting, franchising, etc. (locational specialization) than 
otherwise; it provides better access to external resources and capabilities that a flagship 
needs to complement its core competencies (outsourcing); and it has reduced the 
constraints for a geographic dispersion of the value chain (spatial mobility). 
We also need to emphasize a perplexing result: as liberalization has been adopted 
as an almost universal policy doctrine, it has lost much of its earlier power to influence 
locational decisions. As their FDI policies become indistinguishable, host countries are 
forced to differentiate themselves by other means, and to implement much more 
aggressive policies. The result has been a rapid proliferation of complementary policies 
geared to “business facilitation” and the “development of created assets” (Dunning, 
2000). This explains why a replication of clustering effects at multiple locations may now 
have greater chances than before. 
2.2 The Dual Impact of Information and Communication Technology 
A second important driver of GFN has been the rapid development and diffusion 
of  cheaper and more powerful information and communication technologies (IT) (e.g., 
Sichel. 1997, and Flamm, 1999) that has culminated in the Internet (Naughton, 2000; 
Abbate, 2000). A combination of technological and economic developments is 
responsible for the transformation of DIS as a management tool from automation to 
information resource management, and then on to Internet-enabled cross-border 
knowledge management (Ernst, 2001e).  
  7 On the technology side, the move towards “open standards” in DIS architecture 
(UNIX, Linux, and HTML) and protocols (TCP/IP) enabled firms to integrate their 
existing intranets and extranets
3 on the Internet, which, by reducing cost and by 
multiplying connectivity, dramatically extended their reach across firm boundaries and 
national borders. 
  On the economic side, increasingly complex information requirements resulted 
from the long-standing trend toward vertical specialization (Mowery and Macher, 2001). 
As firms now have to deal with constantly changing, large numbers of specialized 
suppliers, they need flexible and adaptive information systems to support these diverse 
linkages. These requirements became ever more demanding, as flagships attempt to 
integrate their dispersed production, knowledge and customer bases into global and 
regional flagship networks (GFN) ( see below). 
Second, far-reaching changes in work organization have fundamentally increased 
the requirements for information management and for the exchange of knowledge (e.g., 
Ciborra et al, 2000). The transition from Fordist “mass production” to “mass 
customization” requires a capacity to constantly adapt products or services to changing 
customer requirements, “sensing and responding” to individual customer needs in real 
time (Bradley and Nolan, 1998)
4. This necessitates dynamic, interactive information 
systems, and a capacity to rapidly adjust GFN to disruptive changes in markets and 
technology. Third, real-time resource allocation, performance monitoring and accounting 
became necessary, due to the short-term pressures of the financial system (quarterly 
                                                 
3 An “intranet” is defined as a private network contained within an organization (a firm) that consists of 
many inter-linked LANs (= local-area networks). Its main purpose is to share company information and 
computer resources among employees. An “extranet” in turn is a private network that links the flagship via 
conventional telecommunications networks with preferred suppliers, customers and strategic partners.  
  8 reports) and due to the shortening life cycles of products and technologies. Fourth, to 
cope with ever more demanding competitive requirements, firms have to continuously 
adapt their organization and strategy. Internet-enabled computer networking thus can act 
as a powerful catalyst for organizational change. 
The increasing use of DIS has had a dual impact:  it has increased the need for 
globalization, while at the same time facilitating this process. This argument is based on 
two propositions. First, the cost and risk of developing DIS has been a primary cause for 
market globalization: international markets are required to amortize fully the enormous 
R&D expenses associated with rapidly evolving process and product information 
technologies (Kobrin, 1997, p.149). Of equal importance are the huge expenses for 
developing and implementing DIS, a process that can exhaust the financial means of even 
the largest global flagships (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Ernst and O`Connor,1992: 
chapter 1). As the extent of a company´s R&D effort is determined by the nature of its 
technology and competition rather than its size, this rapid growth of R&D spending 
requires a corresponding expansion of sales, if profitability is to be maintained. No 
national market, not even the US market, is large enough to amortize such huge expenses. 
A second proposition explains why international production, rather than exports, 
has become the main vehicle for international market share expansion. Of critical 
importance has been the enabling role played by DIS. These systems substantially 
increase the mobility, i.e. dispersion of firm-specific resources and capabilities across 
national boundaries. They also provide greater scope for cross-border linkages, i.e. the 
integration of dispersed specialized clusters. This has substantially reduced the friction of 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 For good reason, this has given rise to concern about invasion of data privacy. 
  9 time and space, both with regard to markets and production: a firm can now serve distant 
markets equally well as local producers; it can also now disperse its value chain across 
national borders in order to select the most cost-effective location. 
There are widespread expectations that the Internet, the latest incarnation of 
digital convergence, may further accelerate these transformations (e.g., Department of 
Commerce, 2000). By transmitting information in digital format instantly, and at much 
lower cost than earlier technology generations (like electronic data interchange, EDI), the 
Internet substantially broadens the scope for collaboration across organizational and 
national boundaries. A new generation of networking software provides flexible 
infrastructures that, computer scientists claim, “support not only information exchange, 
but also knowledge sharing, creation and utilization.” (Jørgensen and Krogstie, 
2000).The key is the open-ended structure of the Internet, which allows extra networks to 
be added at any point, creating almost unlimited opportunities for outsourcing and the 
diffusion of knowledge. 
Surprisingly, the impact of the Internet on business organization is still a largely 
neglected research topic. Until recently, important contributions to information 
management neglect and hardly mention the Internet and the world-wide web
5. Very little 
research exists on how the Internet reshapes business strategy and organization, and how 
                                                 
5 An important book like Strategic Planning for Information Systems (Ward and Griffiths, 1996) mentions 
the Internet just once, but then as a synonym for the information super highway. And the edited volume 
Global Information Technology and Systems Management (Palvia et al, 1996) mentions the Internet briefly 
three times on its more than 600 pages, but fails to provide an explicit analysis. 
  10 this affects industry structure
6. Even less research exists on how the Internet transforms 
international aspects of business networks
7. 
Following Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), we argue that the impact of the Internet 
on economic performance is mediated by a combination of intangible inputs as well as 
intangible outputs that act as powerful catalysts for organizational innovations. Intangible 
inputs include, for instance, the development of new software and databases; the 
adjustment of  existing business processes; the recruitment of specialized human 
resources and their continuous upgrading; and, induced by all of this, the transformation 
of existing organizational structures and business strategies. Of equal importance are 
intangible outputs that would not exist without the Internet, like speed of delivery, 
flexible customization, the transition to a built-to-order (BTO) production model, and 
improved customer-relations management (CRM).  
After a while, these induced organizational changes lead to productivity growth, 
by reducing the cost of coordination, communications and information processing. Most 
importantly,  these organizational changes enable firms “to increase output quality in the 
form of new products or in improvements in intangible aspects of existing products like 
convenience, timeliness, quality and variety.” (Brynjolfson and Hitt, 2000, p.4). In short, 
we are talking about a complex process that involves a set of inter-related (“systemic”) 
changes: by combining the Internet with changes in work practices, strategies, and 
                                                 
6 Noteworthy exceptions are Nolan (2000), Hagstrøm (2000), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), and Evans and 
Wurster (2000). 
7 On the impact of the Internet on GFN, see Mowery and Macher (2001), Luethje (2001) 
and Ernst (2000b, 2001a, and 2001b). On Internet-enabled knowledge exchange, see 
Lerner and Tirole (2000), and Weber (2001). 
  11 products and services, a firm transforms its organization as well as its relations with 
suppliers, partners and customers.  
Once we adapt such a framework, it becomes clear that the possible benefits from 
an Internet-enabled transformation of business organizations are enormous. The Internet 
provides ample scope for cost reduction across all stages of the production process both 
for the flagship company and Asian suppliers. Procurement costs can be reduced by 
means of expanded markets and increased competition through Internet-enabled online 
procurement systems. Another cost-reducing option is to shift sales and information 
dissemination to lower-cost on-line channels.  
The Internet can also drastically accelerate speed-to-market by reducing the time 
it takes to transmit, receive, and process routine business communications such as 
purchase orders, invoices, and shipping notifications. The Internet has greatly expanded 
the scope for information management: documents and technical drawings can be 
exchanged in real time, legally recognized signatures can be authenticated, browsers can 
be used to access the information systems of suppliers and customers, and transactions 
can be completed much more quickly. 
A further advantage can be found in the low cost of expanding a functioning 
network. While establishing a network requires large upfront fixed investment costs 
(purchasing equipment, laying new cable, training), the cost of adding an additional user 
to the network is negligible. The value of the network thus increases with the number of 
participants (“network externalities”). An especially important benefit is a reduced trade-
off between the richness and the reach of information (Evans and Wurster, 2000). Until 
recently, more complex, detailed, nuanced information could only be shared by a very 
  12 small number of people; in-creasing the “reach” of such information sharing requires a 
reduction in “richness.” The Internet provides far greater opportunities to share rich 
information with a far greater number of people
8.  
In addition, the Internet and related organizational innovations provide effective 
mechanisms for constructing flexible infrastructures that can link together and coordinate 
knowledge exchange between distant locations (Hagstrøm, 2000; Pedersen et al, 1999; 
Antonelli, 1992). This has important implications for organizational choices and 
locational strategies of firms. In essence, Internet-enabled DIS foster the development of 
leaner, meaner and more agile production systems that cut across firm boundaries and 
national borders. The underlying vision is that of a network of networks that enable a 
global network flagship to respond quickly to changing circumstances, even if much of 
its value chain has been dispersed. 
2.3 Competition and Industrial Organization 
Both liberalization and DIS have drastically changed the dynamics of 
competition. Again, we reduce the complexity of these changes and concentrate on two 
impacts: a broader geographic scope of competition; and a growing complexity of 
competitive requirements. Competition now cuts across national borders - a firm´s 
position in one country is no longer independent from its position in other countries (e.g., 
Porter, 1990). This has two implications. The firm must be present in all major growth 
markets (dispersion).  It must also integrate its activities on a worldwide scale, in order to 
exploit and coordinate linkages between these different locations (integration). 
Competition also cuts across sector boundaries and market segments: mutual raiding of 
                                                 
8 The book by Evans and Wurster has been widely quoted. Unfortunately, their terminology is confusing. I 
  13 established market segment fiefdoms has become the norm, making it more difficult for 
firms to identify market niches and to grow with them.  
This has forced firms to engage in complex strategic games to pre-empt a 
competitors’ move. This is especially the case for knowledge-intensive industries like 
electronics (Ernst, 2001d). Intense price competition needs to be combined with product 
differentiation, in a situation where continuous price wars erode profit margins. Of 
critical importance, however, is speed-to-market: getting the right product to the largest 
volume segment of the market right on time can provide huge profits. Being late can be a 
disaster, and may even drive a firm out of business. The result has been an increasing 
uncertainty and volatility, and a destabilization of established market leadership positions 
(Richardson, 1996; Ernst, 1998).  
This growing complexity of competition has changed the determinants of firm 
organization and growth, as well as the determinants of location. No firm, not even a 
dominant market leader, can generate all the different capabilities internally that are 
necessary to cope with the requirements of global competition. Competitive success thus 
critically depends on a capacity to selectively source specialized capabilities outside the 
firm that can range from simple contract assembly to quite sophisticated design 
capabilities. This requires a shift from individual to increasingly collective forms of 
organization, from the multidivisional (M-form) functional hierarchy (e.g., Williamson, 
1975 and 1985; Chandler, 1977) of “multinational corporations” to the networked global 
flagship model. 
                                                                                                                                                 
prefer a distinction between codified and tacit knowledge. See, Ernst, Fagerberg, Hildrum, 2001 
  14 Take the electronics industry, which has become the most important breeding 
ground for this new industrial organization model. Over the last decades, a massive 
process of vertical specialization has segmented an erstwhile vertically integrated 
industry into closely interacting horizontal layers ( fig.1)(Grove, 1996). An important 
catalyst was the availability of standard components, which allowed for a change in 
computer design away from centralized (IBM mainframe) to decentralized architectures 
(PC, and PC-related networks). Equally important has been the impact of the Internet that 
has facilitated the modularization and geographic dispersion of software design and 
engineering (Ernst, 2001f). This mirrors earlier developments for the manufacturing of 
electronics hardware. The Internet facilitates the exchange of knowledge between actors 
that are not permanently co-located. 
 
Fig.1. Vertical Specialization: Electronics Industry 
 
This has given rise to the co-existence of complex, globally organized product- 
specific value chains (e.g., for microprocessors, memories, board assembly, PCs, 
operating systems, applications software, and networking equipment). Each of these 
value chains consists of a variety of GFN that compete with each other, but that may also 
cooperate (Ernst, 2001c). The number of such networks, and the intensity of competition 
varies across sectors, reflecting their different stage of development and their 
idiosyncratic industry structures.  
 
3. THE FLAGSHIP NETWORK MODEL 
  15 In short, by integrating their dispersed supply, knowledge and customer bases into 
global (and regional) production networks, “multinational corporations” are being 
transformed into “global network flagships”. Until recently, these fundamental changes 
in the organization of international production have been largely neglected in the 
literature, both in research on knowledge spill-overs through FDI, and in research on the 
internationalization of corporate R&D. This is now beginning to change. There is a 
growing acceptance in the literature that, to capture the impact of globalization on 
industrial organization and upgrading, the focus of our analysis needs to shift away from 
the industry and the individual firm to the international dimension of business networks 
(e.g., Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; UNCTAD, 1993; Rugman and D´Cruz, 2000; 
Birkinshaw and Hagstrøm, 2000). 
3.1. Peculiar Features 
Let us now look at peculiar features of the concept of a GFN. It covers both intra-
firm and inter-firm transactions and forms of coordination (fig.2): a GFN links together 
the flagship´s own subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures with its subcontractors, 
suppliers, service providers, as well as partners in strategic alliances. A network flagship 
like IBM or Intel breaks down the value chain into a variety of discrete functions and 
locates them wherever they can be carried out most effectively, where they improve the 
flagship’s access to resources and capabilities, and where they are needed to facilitate the 
penetration of important growth markets. GFN differ from foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in that a great variety of governance structures is possible. These networks range 
from loose linkages that are formed to implement a particular project and that are 
  16 dissolved after the project is finished
9, to highly formalized networks, with clearly 
defined rules, common business processes and shared information infrastructures. What 
matters is that formalized networks do not require common ownership: these 
arrangements may, or may not involve control of equity stakes. 
 
Fig.2 The Nodes of a Global Flagship  Network 
 
The main purpose of these  networks is to provide the flagship with quick and 
low-cost access to resources, capabilities and knowledge that are complementary to its 
core competencies. In other words, transaction cost savings matter. Yet, the real benefits 
result from the dissemination, exchange and outsourcing of knowledge and 
complementary capabilities. This indicates that GFN also differ from traditional forms of 
subcontracting: much denser interaction between design and production and other stages 
of the value chain require substantially more intense exchange of information and 
knowledge. This reflects the growing reliance of network flagships on the skills and 
knowledge of specialized suppliers to enhance their core competencies. 
A focus on international knowledge diffusion through an extension of firm 
organization across national boundaries distinguishes our concept of GFN from network 
theories developed by sociologists, economic geographers and innovation theorists that 
focus on localized, mostly inter-personal networks (e.g., Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994). 
The central problem of these theories is that industries now operate in a global rather than 
a localized setting (Ernst, Guerrieri et al, 2001). Important complementarities exist 
                                                 
9 In the computer networking literature, such arrangements are often called “virtual enterprises” ( e.g., 
  17 however with work on global commodity chains (GCC) (e.g., Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 
1994). A primary concern of the GCC literature has been to explore  how different value 
chain stages in an industry ( i.e. textiles) are dispersed across borders and how the 
position of a particular location in such GCC affects its development potential
10.  
As for the dynamics of network evolution, our approach complements the 
transaction cost approach to networks and vertical disintegration that centers on the 
presumed efficiency gains from these organizational choices (e.g., Williamson, 1985 and 
1997; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). The latter approach skips some of the more 
provocative chapters in the economic history of the modern corporation.  Chandler’s 
vibrant histories (e.g., 1962 and 1990) show that the quest for profits and market power 
via increased throughput and speed of coordination were more important in explaining 
hierarchy than the traditional emphasis on transaction costs. This implies that the analysis 
of the determinants of institutional form must move beyond a narrow focus on 
transactions costs to the broader competitive environment in which firms operate. It is 
time to bring back into the analysis market structure and competitive dynamics, as well 
as the role played by knowledge and innovation. Like hierarchies, GFN not only promise 
to improve efficiency, but can permit flagships to sustain quasi-monopoly positions, 
generate market power through specialization, and raise entry barriers; they also enhance 
the network flagships´ capacity for innovation (Ernst, 1997b; Borrus, Ernst, Haggard, 
2000: chapter1) .  
                                                                                                                                                 
Pedersen et al, 1999: 16) 
10 Strong complementarities also exist with research on computer-based flexible information infrastructures 
that frequently uses the terms “extended enterprise” or “virtual enterprise”, where the first stands for more 
durable network arrangements, while the latter for very short-term ones ( e.g., Pedersen, 1999; Jørgesen 
and Krogstie, 2000).  
  18 Two distinctive characteristics of GFN that are enhanced by DIS shape the scope 
for international knowledge diffusion: a rapid yet concentrated dispersion of value chain 
activities, and, simultaneously, their integration into hierarchical networks.  
3.2. Concentrated Dispersion 
IT-enabled GFN typically combine a breath-taking speed of geographic 
dispersion with spatial concentration on a growing, but still limited number of specialized 
clusters. To simplify, we distinguish two types of clusters: “centers of excellence” that 
combine unique resources, such as R&D and precision mechanical engineering, and “cost 
and time reduction centers” that thrive on the timely provision of lower-cost services
11. 
The inclusion of both types of clusters into GFN creates new opportunities for knowledge 
diffusion between network flagships and local suppliers. Different clusters face different 
opportunities and constraints, depending on their specialization, and on the product 
composition of the GFN. The dispersion of clusters differs across the value chain: it 
increases, the closer one gets to the final product, while dispersion remains concentrated 
especially for critical precision components (fig.3). 
 
Fig.3. Product Composition and Geographic Dispersion of Clusters 
(geo disp nrc.oslo) 
 
Let us look at some indicators in the electronics industry, a pace setter of the 
flagship network model (Ernst, 2001d). On one end of the spectrum is final PC assembly 
                                                 
11 “Cost & time reduction centers” include the usual suspects in Asia (Korea, Taiwan, China, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and now also India for software engineering and web services),but also exist in once peripheral 
locations in Europe (e.g., Ireland, Central and Eastern Europe and Russia),  in Brazil, and Mexico in Latin 
  19 that is widely dispersed to major growth markets in the US, Europe and Asia. Dispersion 
is still quite extended for standard, commodity-type components, but less so than for final 
assembly. For instance, flagships can source keyboards, computer mouse devices and 
power switch supplies from many different sources, both in Asia, Mexico and the 
European periphery, with Taiwanese firms playing a major role as intermediate supply 
chain coordinators. The same is true for lower-end printed circuit boards. Concentration 
of dispersion increases, the more we move toward more complex, capital-intensive 
precision components: memory devices and displays are sourced primarily from “centers 
of excellence” in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore; and hard disk drives from a 
Singapore-centered triangle of locations in Southeast Asia. Finally, dispersion becomes 
most concentrated for high-precision, design-intensive components that pose the most 
demanding requirements on the mix of capabilities that a firm and its cluster needs to 
master: microprocessors for instance are sourced from a few globally dispersed affiliates 
of Intel, two secondary American suppliers, and one recent entrant from Taiwan (Via 
Technologies).  
The hard disk drive (HDD) industry provides another example both for quick 
dispersion, as well as for spatial concentration (Ernst, 1997b). Until the early 1980s, 
almost all HDD production was concentrated in the U.S., with limited additional 
production facilities in Japan and Europe. Today, only 1 percent of the final assembly of 
HDDs has remained in the US, while Southeast Asia dominates with almost 70% of 
world production, based on units shipped. Slightly less than half of the world´s disk 
                                                                                                                                                 
America, in some Caribbean locations ( like Costa Rica), and in a few spots elsewhere in the socalled RoW 
(= rest of the world). 
  20 drives come from Singapore, with most of the rest of the region´s production being 
concentrated in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
Seagate, the current industry leader provides a good example of the flagship 
model of concentrated dispersion. Today, Seagate operates 22 plants worldwide: 14 of 
these plants, i.e. 64% of the total, are located in Asia. Asia's share in Seagate's worldwide 
production capacity, as expressed in sq-ft, has increased from roughly 35% in 1990 to 
slightly more than 61% in 1995 - an incredible speed of expansion. Concentrated 
dispersion is also reflected in the regional  breakdown of Seagate's employment. Asia's 
share increased from around 70% in 1990 to more than 85% in 1995.  
In short, rapid cross-border dispersion coexists with  agglomeration. GFN extend 
national clusters across national borders. This implies two things: First, some stages of 
the value chain are internationally dispersed, while others remain concentrated. And 
second, the internationally dispersed activities typically congregate in a limited number 
of overseas clusters. This clearly indicates that agglomeration economies continue to 
matter, hence the path-dependent nature of development trajectories for individual 
specialized clusters. 
 
3.3. Integration: Hierarchical Layers of Network Participants 
 A GFN  encompasses both intra-firm and inter-firm linkages and integrates a 
diversity of network participants who differ in their access to and in their position within 
such networks, and hence face very different opportunities and challenges. This implies 
that networks do not necessarily give rise to less hierarchical forms of firm organization 
(as predicted for instance in Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989, and in Nohria and Eccles, 1993). 
  21 GFN typically consist of various hierarchical layers that range from network flagships 
that dominate such networks, down to a variety of usually smaller, local specialized 
network suppliers. This taxonomy helps to assess the different capacities of network 




We distinguish two types of global flagships: i) “brand leaders” (BL), like Cisco, 
GE, IBM, Compaq or Dell; and ii) “contract manufacturers” (CM), like for instance 
Solectron or Flextronics, that establish their own GFN to provide integrated global 
supply chain services to the “global brand leaders”. Cisco is an interesting example of a 
“brand leader”
13: its GFN connects the flagship to 32 manufacturing plants worldwide. 
These suppliers are formally independent, but they go through a lengthy process of 
certification to ensure that they meet Cisco´s demanding requirements. Outsourcing 
volume manufacturing and related support services enables “brand leaders” to combine 
cost reduction, product differentiation and time-to-market. Equally important are 
financial considerations: getting rid of low-margin manufacturing helps the BL to 
increase shareholder returns
14. 
                                                 
12 The role of local suppliers has been addressed in Ernst and Kim, 2001. 
13 Other examples can be found in Ernst, 1997a and 1997b, Ernst and Ravenhill, 1999, and in Borrus, 
Ernst, and Haggard, 2000. 
14 Other important drivers of outsourcing include hedging against damage due to volatile markets and 
periodic excess capacity; and scale economies: surface-mount-technology (SMT) requires large production 
runs, reflecting its growing capital and knowledge intensity. 
  22 “Contract manufacturers” have rapidly increased in importance since the mid-
1990s
15. This represents an acceleration of a long-standing trend towards vertical 
specialization in the electronics industry (Mowery and Macher, 2001). The role model of 
CM-type network flagships is Solectron that only a few years ago was a typical SME, but 
has transformed itself into the electronics industry`s largest CM. With a CAGR of 43% 
over the past five years, Solectron has increased its worldwide locations from about 10 in 
1996 to almost 50 today (Luethje, 2001). The company defines itself now as a global 
supply chain facilitator: global brand leaders “… can turn to Solectron at any stage of the 
supply chain, anywhere in the world, and get the highest-quality, most flexible solutions 
to optimize their existing supply chains “.(Solectron, 2000: 1).  
The flagship is at the heart of a network: it provides strategic and organizational 
leadership beyond the resources that, from an accounting perspective, lie directly under 
its management control (Rugman, 1997: 182). The strategy of the flagship company thus 
directly affects the growth, the strategic direction and network position of lower-end 
participants, like specialized suppliers and subcontractors. The latter, in turn, “ have no 
reciprocal influence over the flagship strategy” (Rugman and D´Cruz, 2000, p.84)
16. The 
flagship derives its strength from its control over critical resources and capabilities that 
facilitate innovation (e.g., Lazonick, 2000), and from its capacity to coordinate 
                                                 
15 With an average annual growth of more than 25% between 1995 and 2000, the so-called electronics 
manufacturing services  (EMS) market has been one of the fastest growing electronics sectors, expanding 
twice as quickly as the total electronics industry. 
16  With Rugman`s flagship model, we share the emphasis on the hierarchical nature of these networks. 
However, there are important differences. Rugman and D`Cruz (2000) focus on localized networks within 
a region; they also include “non-business infrastructure” as “network partners”. We do not share their  
assumption that a combination of transaction cost and resource-based theory is sufficient to explain such 
forms of business organization. 
  23 transactions and knowledge exchange between the different network nodes. Both are the 
sources of its superior capacity for generating profits.  
Increasing vertical specialization is the fundamental driver of this flagship model 
of industrial organization. Flagships retain in-house activities in which they have a 
particular strategic advantage; they outsource those in which they do not. It is important 
to emphasize the diversity of such outsourcing patterns (Ernst,1997b). Some flagships 
focus on design, product development and marketing, outsourcing volume manufacturing 
and related support services. Other flagships outsource as well a variety of high-end, 
knowledge-intensive support services. This includes for instance trial production 
(prototyping and ramping-up), tooling and equipment, benchmarking of productivity, 
testing, process adaptation, product customization and supply chain coordination. It may 
also include design and product development.  
DIS, and especially the open-ended structure of the Internet substantially 
broadens the scope for outsourcing. Both network flagships and first-tier suppliers have 
shifted from partial outsourcing, covering the nuts and bolts of manufacturing, to 
systemic outsourcing that includes knowledge-intensive support services. This has 
intensified the competition among the providers of outsourcing services: competition 
now focuses on the capacity to provide manufacturing and design services wherever 
required
17. What matters is the variety of outsourcing arrangements that the Internet has 
generated. Our first example concerns the outsourcing of logistics services. FedEx, for 
example orchestrates the assembly and shipping of laptop computers for Fujitsu; this has 
                                                 
17 Take the electronics industry. For lower-cost outsourcing, network flagships can now choose between 
alternative locations, established by major contract manufacturers in Asia, Latin America, the former 
Soviet bloc, and the European periphery. For higher-end outsourcing, flagships can choose between 
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or 4 days. By turning over much of its computerized distribution system to FedEx, 
Fujitsu has been able to remove the warehousing and inventory costs from its supply 
chain, cutting inventory 90 percent. 
Increasingly however the focus of outsourcing is shifting to knowledge-intensive 
support services, including most aspects of information management. For instance, 
Internet service providers (ISP) provide fee-based access to Internet applications and 
resources for individuals and companies. Web hosting refers to the outsourcing of web 
site design and maintenance to specialized third party companies that can reap economies 
of scale and scope. And application service providers (ASP) provide mission-critical 
applications, such as ERP, HRM, SCM and CRM on a subscription basis. 
While the Internet acts as an important enabling technology, there are additional 
reasons to expect outsourcing pressures to grow: the IT skills shortage
18; the speed and 
unpredictability of changes in Internet technologies and markets, which makes it risky 
anyway to sustain large in-house IT work forces; and the high life-cycle costs of 
purchasing and maintaining networking equipment and Internet applications
19. Equally 
important is that intense competition among major producers of Internet software and 
                                                                                                                                                 
specialized clusters in Nordic countries, the US, France and Germany, as well as Israel, Ireland, and 
Hungary. 
18 During 2000, it was projected that 50% of the 1.6 million IT-related jobs in the US would remain 
unfilled (Information Technology Association of America, May 10, 2000, at: www.ita.org). Since  then, 
however, the global downturn in the electronics industry has relieved this pressure. Massive retrenchments 
in the US and Europe may now increase ( at least for a while) developing Asia`s access to IT skills. 
19 While intense competition reduces unit prices of Internet software and networking equipment, the frantic 
pace of technological change in both areas has drastically cut product-life cycles. For each generation, this 
has increased the life cycle costs of purchase and maintenance. Again, the current downturn in the 
electronics industry may slow down these developments. 
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outsourcing as an important market penetration strategy. 
The result is that an increasing share of the value-added becomes dispersed across 
the boundaries of the firm as well as across national borders. Even if these activities do 
not involve formal R&D, they may still require a substantial exchange of knowledge. 
Hence, under certain conditions, GFN may enhance the diffusion of knowledge across 
firm boundaries and national borders and, arguably, improve the opportunities for 
knowledge sharing and interactive learning without co-location.  
 
4. PREREQUISITES FOR KNOWLEDGE DIFFUSION 
Under what conditions can GFN generate effective knowledge diffusion? And 
what needs to be done to strengthen the position of local suppliers? The missing link in 
our argument is that local suppliers are exposed to a combination of pressures and 
incentives from network flagships to upgrade their capabilities ( see fig.4). This provides 
important upgrading opportunities for those, mostly higher-tier, local suppliers that 
possess a critical mass of resources and capabilities.  
 
Fig. 4 Global Flagship Networks: Catalysts for Knowledge Diffusion? 
Let us recapitulate the fundamental rationale of GFN: they help flagships to 
sustain their competitiveness, by providing them with access to specialized suppliers at 
lower-cost locations that excel in quick and flexible response to the flagships` 
requirements. The flagships can exert considerable pressure on local suppliers, especially 
in developing countries: they can discipline suppliers  by threatening to drop them from 
  26 the networks whenever they fail to provide the required services at low price and world 
class quality.  
 
4.1. Opportunities 
At the same time, GFN also act as powerful carriers of knowledge. First, flagships 
need to transfer technical and managerial knowledge to the local suppliers. This is 
necessary  to upgrade the suppliers` technical and managerial skills, so that they can meet 
the technical specifications of the flagships. It has been argued that flagship- dominated 
business networks can be a boon rather than a bane for knowledge transfer (Rugman and 
D`Cruz, 2000: p.58). Their asymmetric distribution of resources, power and decision-
making can facilitate trust and credible commitments, enhancing stability, coherence and 
organizational learning. This, it is argued, reduces the risks that flagships encounter when 
sharing technology
20 . 
Second, once a network supplier successfully upgrades its capabilities, this 
creates an incentive for flagships to transfer more sophisticated knowledge, including 
engineering, product and process development. This reflects the increasingly demanding 
competitive requirements that we referred to earlier. In the electronics industry for 
instance, product-life-cycles have been cut to six months, and sometimes less (Ernst, 
2001d). Overseas production thus frequently occurs soon after the launching of new 
products. This is only possible if flagships share key design information more freely with 
overseas affiliates and suppliers. Speed-to-market requires that engineers across the 
                                                 
20 The authors acknowledge that this knowledge-sharing is limited to a select group of key suppliers, 
customers and strategic competitors who collaborate in selective alliances. 
  27 different nodes of a GFN are plugged into the flagship´s design debates on a regular 
basis.  
DIS, and especially the Internet generate new opportunities for improving 
communication routines, blending old forms of communication (e.g., face-to-face) with 
new forms ( e.g. on-line). Of course, the Internet is no substitute for traditional modes of 
communication. However, it facilitates knowledge exchange without co-location,   
provided that the agents involved know each other through earlier face-to-face informal 
conversations that has allowed them to establish mutual trust. Once this basis exists, the 
Internet provides previously unavailable opportunities for knowledge exchange among 
distant locations. 
  In short, GFN expose local suppliers to the flagship`s management practices and 
technological knowledge. International technology transfer has been extensively studied, 
but research has primarily focused on such formal mechanisms as foreign direct 
investment and foreign licensing. These formal mechanisms, however, are only the tip of 
the iceberg. A larger amount of technical knowledge is transferred through various 
informal mechanisms that involve a substantial amount of tacit knowledge (e.g., Wong, 
1991; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Kim, 1997; Ernst, Ganiatsos and Mytelka, 1998; Saxenian, 
2001; Ernst and Lundvall, 2000; Ernst, 2000a). This includes early supplier involvement 
in product design and prototype development; access to proprietary technical and 
marketing information on end users` requirements and on competitors' products; informal 
sharing of technical information and ideas between the flagship and different network 
nodes; and knowledge exchange through informal, transnational peer group networks. 
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  Of course, knowledge transfer is not a sufficient condition for effective 
knowledge diffusion. Diffusion is completed only when transferred knowledge is 
internalized and translated into the capability of the local suppliers (e.g., Kim, 1997, and 
Ernst, Mytelka and Ganiatsos, 1998). Important constraints exist that can derail this 
process. Once a network flagship extends its value chain across national boundaries, it is 
faced with complex coordination problems. This has given rise to a debate about how 
firms can improve “corporate coherence”, as more and more value chain activities 
migrate to external actors (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter, 1994).  
Another constraint to the diffusion of knowledge within GFN are differences in 
the approach to knowledge creation. It has been argued that peculiar features of national 
institutions, especially with regard to education, labor markets and occupational systems, 
have led to distinctive national approaches of firms to learning and knowledge formation,  
and that this constrains knowledge sharing and inter-organizational learning across 
national borders (Lam, 1998).  
  Equally important  for effective knowledge diffusion are the motivations, 
resources and capabilities of local suppliers (Ernst and Kim, 2001). This brings us back 
to the pressures exerted by network flagships. Under certain conditions, these pressures 
can catalyze local suppliers into concerted upgrading efforts. Typically, the flagships` 
outsourcing requirements have become more demanding. Cisco for instance selects 
suppliers according to three criteria: a solid financial standing; high ratings on a quarterly 
scoreboard measuring performance in delivery, quality etc.; and speed of response. The 
latter is of critical importance: suppliers are expected to respond within hours with a 
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quality. This implies that local suppliers can only upgrade or perish. To stay on the GFN, 
local suppliers must develop their capabilities through internalizing transferred 
knowledge. The only way for suppliers to survive the intense pressures imposed by the 
flagships, is to upgrade from a position of simple contract manufacturers (so-called “box 
shifters”) to providers of integrated, knowledge-intensive support service packages.  
At the same time, network participation can also provide incentives for local 
suppliers to invest in their knowledge base and capabilities. This requires however that 
the flagship reduces the perceived risk of such investments through a longer-term 
commitment; that network participation provides the supplier with a stable source of 
income to finance the investment; and that the network offers access to superior market 
and technology information that may reduce the risks involved in the investment 
decision. These are fairly demanding requirements that not all networks meet. There is a 
clear need for government policies and support institutions that enable local suppliers to 
exploit the opportunities and pressures that result from network participation, and that 
induce flagships to provide the above incentives. Realistically, the focus of such policies 
has to be on the promotion of local suppliers (as illustrated for instance by Singapore). 
Most governments (with the exception of quasi-continental economies like China, India 
and Brazil) are simply to weak to influence flagship behavior. There is however room for 
policies to exploit existing differences in flagship behavior. It is now well established 
that nationality of ownership of network flagships, home country institutions and product 
mix (specialization) explain why GFN differ in their governance structures, and hence in 
  30 the incentives they provide for capability upgrading investment by local suppliers (Ernst 
and Ravenhill, 1999; Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 2000, chapter1). 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
In short, under certain circumstances, GFN may provide a combination of new 
opportunities, pressures and incentives for local suppliers to upgrade their capabilities. 
Two effects can be distinguished: First, GFN can act as a conduit for knowledge 
diffusion for state-of-the-art management approaches as well as product and process 
technologies, including the required tacit knowledge. At the same time, the requirements 
of network flagships can also provide both pressures and incentives to catalyze 
knowledge creation and capability development within firms and industrial districts in 
developing economies. 
But these networks are no substitute of course for domestic upgrading efforts. 
Without the latter, network integration may equally well erode a country´s sources of 
competitive advantage. It may also sap the strengths of existing clusters and truncate their 
upgrading possibilities. Network integration of some “higher-tier” suppliers may well 
increase the divide between firms and districts that have and those that do not have 
access to the information and knowledge that is necessary to reap the benefits of network 
participation. Many people are understandably concerned that this may lead to a decline 
in economic growth and welfare. There is however cause for cautious optimism: network 
participation may provide new opportunities for effective knowledge diffusion to local 
firms and industrial districts in developing countries, provided appropriate policies and 
support institutions are in place.  
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their domestic knowledge base and generate specialized capabilities. This cannot be left 
to market forces alone. Markets are notoriously weak in generating knowledge and 
capabilities, as both are subject to “externalities”: investments are typically characterized 
by a gap between private and social rates of return (K. Arrow,1962). Reducing this gap 
requires corrective policy interventions that provide incentives, as well as the necessary 
infrastructure, support services and human resources.  
While the neo-classical concept of “market failure” provides a rationale for policy 
intervention, it is of limited value for designing its contents (Lipsey, 2001). A 
fundamental weakness of this concept is its general equilibrium assumption: defined as a 
deviation from the market clearing equilibrium under conditions of perfect competition, 
the remedy is to return to a theoretically achievable static optimum. It is now well 
accepted that perfect competition hardly ever reigns in markets that characterize modern 
industry. It is thus misleading to think of market failure as something that can, or should, 
be `remedied` so that the economy can be brought back to a desired static optimum. 
In any case, this concept is patently inappropriate for defining the agenda for 
public policy response to  the new mobility of knowledge. DIS and GFN both reduce the 
friction of time and space to knowledge exchange. This, in turn, accelerates the pace of 
change in markets and technology and increase uncertainty and the volatility of market 
structures, industrial organization and firm behavior (e.g., Ernst, 2001d). Equally 
important, almost all aspects of knowledge creation and learning are characterized by 
market failure: this is true for information and codified knowledge, and even more so for 
tacit knowledge. Information/codified knowledge is difficult to trade in a market: 
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is invariably the case with technical change, free markets cannot in principle meet the 
strict requirements of optimal resource allocation (Stiglitz, 1998).  
The design of public policy thus must move beyond the “market failure” 
rationale. This does not imply a return to the status quo ante of the strong developmental 
state (as suggested  for instance by  Wade and Veneroso, 1998). The challenge is to 
redefine the role of government intervention (Rodrik, 2000). The real question, then, is 
no longer whether national policies and institutions can make a difference. Instead, it is 
what kind of policies and institutions will prove most conducive for unlocking new 
sources of economic growth in a globally connected “digital economy” 
Globalization, paradoxically enough, has increased the necessity of such policies. 
But there is also now more space for national policy and politics to vary and to make a 
difference. A growing body of research on economic policy-making in advanced 
industrial countries has demonstrated that choice is possible, in terms of institutions and 
policy instruments, and that this applies to macro-economic policy-making as well as to 
industrial and technology policies ( e.g. Berger and Dore (eds.), 1996). The same is true 
for developing countries. 
There is a growing consensus that liberalization of trade and investment flows 
should not be equalized with a retreat of the state (e.g., Rodrik, 1999; UNCTAD, 1999). 
Liberalization needs to be complemented with proactive and sophisticated industrial, 
innovation and investment policies. Equally important, the spread of DIS to manage GFN 
will raise increasingly demanding requirements for regulatory and policy responses 
(Garcia, 2000). We need to discard the naïve belief that technology, combined with 
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impact of DIS depends not only on the technical performance features of these 
technologies, “but also on their design and architecture as well as the rules governing 
their access and use. To establish and execute such rules, and to resolve competing 
claims with respect to them, some form of governance - operating at all levels - will be 
required. Absence governance, electronic networks will not reduce transaction costs, but 
will, instead, generate greater uncertainty. Networked markets will then - if they do not 
cease to exist  - function very inefficiently as a result.”(Garcia, 2000, p.3). 
In short, not less, but different policies are required. The scope for sophisticated 
regulatory schemes and pro-active technology and industrial policies in a liberal 
ownership regime is far greater than commonly assumed, as demonstrated by the 
example of small Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Taiwan, Singapore and recent 
developments in Korea also illustrate that a variety of approaches is possible to such 
policies, involving a variety of interesting hybrid combinations (Ernst, 2000a, and Ernst, 
2001g). The choice is much larger than is normally assumed. 
This happens at the same time as requirements for public policy response increase 
to adapt economic structures and institutions to the relentless pace of change now taking 
place. The recent advancements in corporate (IT-based) networking practices will 
generate turmoil, growing uncertainties, and social dislocations. In one indication of the 
seriousness of this, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) is now focusing its efforts on changes in policies and economic governance that 
will be necessary to respond to these dramatic changes. The severity of coming economic 
problems was captured in testimony before the U.S. Congress by Andy Grove, former 
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observed, “is about to wipe out entire sections of the economy.” Unless politicians start 
moving “at Internet rather than Washington speed,” America may see “a repeat of the 
social disaster that followed the mechanization of agriculture” (Economist, 1999). This 
warning to the world’s richest country is even more ominous for developing countries 
and transformation economies, and highlights the need for concerted action.  
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